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In this chapter I offer two novel arguments for what I call strong primitivism about cognitive 
phenomenology, the thesis that there exists a phenomenology of cognition that is neither reducible 
to, nor dependent upon, sensory phenomenology.  I then contend that strong primitivism implies 
that phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing.  This latter contention has 
implications for the philosophy of artificial intelligence.  For if sensory processing is not a necessary 
condition for phenomenal consciousness, then it plausibly follows that AI consciousness (assuming 
that it is possible) does not require embodiment.  The overarching goal of this paper is to show how 
different topics in the analytic philosophy of mind can be brought to bear on an important issue in 
the philosophy of artificial intelligence. 
 The central argument considered here is called ‘the Cognitive Phenomenology Argument for 
Disembodied AI Consciousness’.  It is as follows: 
 
The Cognitive Phenomenology Argument for Disembodied AI Consciousness: 
 
P1. Strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is true. 
P2. If strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is true, then phenomenal consciousness 
does not require sensory processing. 
C1. Therefore, phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing. 
P3. If phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing, then AI consciousness 
(assuming that it is possible) does not require embodiment. 
C2. Therefore, AI consciousness (assuming that it is possible) does not require embodiment. 
 
As indicated, I first focus on P1 by presenting two arguments for strong primitivism.  The first 
argument is a phenomenological argument based on the possibility of what some Buddhists and 
mystics call pure consciousness (Smith 2011).  The second argument draws from what’s called the higher-
order thought theory of consciousness (Rosenthal 1986, 1993, 2005).  Importantly, neither of these 
arguments is intended (in this paper at least) to definitively demonstrate the veracity of P1.  The aim 
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of both arguments is to show that strong primitivism is plausible given certain theoretical 
assumptions.1  My goal here, in other words, is merely to establish the following two conditionals:  
 
(CON 1) If pure consciousness is possible, then strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology 
is true. 
  
(CON 2) If the higher-order thought theory of consciousness is true, then strong primitivism about 
cognitive phenomenology is true. 
 
Importantly, strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology might be true even if pure 
consciousness is impossible and even if the higher-order thought theory of consciousness is false. 
Demonstrating the possibility of pure consciousness and the veracity of the higher-order thought 
theory of consciousness simply represent two paths of argumentation which lead to strong 
primitivism. There may be other argumentative paths as well.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I introduces the cognitive phenomenology 
debate in the philosophy of mind and distinguishes between different views of cognitive 
phenomenology. Sections II and III then proceed to motivate strong primitivism about cognitive 
phenomenology by appealing to the possibility of pure consciousness (section II) and the higher-
order thought theory of consciousness (section III). Section IV motivates P2 of the cognitive 
phenomenology argument for disembodied AI consciousness by invoking a principle which I call 
PHEN, which holds that phenomenological independence implies metaphysical independence. 
Section V motivates P3 of the argument by appealing to work in the embodied cognition literature 
in the philosophy of mind. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate 
Until the 1980s, it was mainstream in analytic philosophy of mind to view phenomenality 
and intentionality as two separate aspects of the mental.  This view, which Terrance Horgan and 
John Tienson (2002) call separatism, holds that phenomenal states and intentional states are 
metaphysically independent of one another, meaning that neither kind of state arises from the other 
and that a system can exhibit one and not the other, at least in principle. A phenomenally conscious 
mental state is a state that possess phenomenal character, meaning that there is something it is like to 
be in the state. An intentional mental state, by contrast, is a state that exhibits ‘aboutness’ or that has 
 
1 I am strictly speaking agnostic both with respect to whether pure consciousness is possible, and with respect to 
whether the higher-order thought theory of consciousness is true.  
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representational features or mental contents. Separatism is traditionally motivated by the conviction 
that while occurrent sensory mental states (e.g. the state you are in when actively seeing the color red) 
possess phenomenal character but lack intentional content, occurrent cognitive mental states (e.g. the 
state you are in when actively believing that Hartford is the capital of Connecticut) possess 
intentional content but lack phenomenal character.   
Cognitive phenomenology (CP for short) is a concept in the philosophy of mind that functions to 
undermine separatism.  Proponents of CP assert that occurrent cognitive states are both 
intentionally directed and (in some sense at least) phenomenally conscious.  According to these 
proponents, there is an experiential character associated with thinking, where ‘thinking’ is 
understood to encompass a wide range of propositional attitudes, such as believing, doubting, 
wondering, desiring, entertaining, etc.   
One can distinguish in conceptual space between four different views of cognitive 
phenomenology: 
 
(1) Eliminativism about CP: Cognitive phenomenology does not exist. 
 
(2) Reductionism about CP: Cognitive phenomenology is reducible to sensory phenomenology. 
 
(3) Weak Primitivism about CP: Cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to sensory 
phenomenology, but dependent upon sensory phenomenology. 
 
(4) Strong Primitivism about CP: Cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to, and independent of, 
sensory phenomenology. 
 
Before elucidating these four positions, it is important to highlight that cognitive phenomenology 
only pertains to occurrent cognitive states, which is to say, cognitive states that are being actively 
entertained or tokened by subjects.  Dispositional cognitive states, such as all of my beliefs that I am 
not currently entertaining, are not phenomenally conscious.  For there is nothing it is like to have a 
belief that is not being presently tokened.  With this being said, let us turn towards the four positions 
on CP. 
 Eliminativists about CP concede that occurrent cognitive activities are access conscious, but they 
deny that such activities are phenomenally conscious.  A mental state is access conscious if and only if it 
is available for verbal report, rational inference, and/or the deliberate control of behavior (Block 
1995).  While eliminativists acknowledge that occurrent desires, beliefs, wonderings, etc. are available 
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for these uses, they reject the notion that there is something it is like to be in these cognitive states.2  
By contrast, reductionists grant that cognition involves phenomenology, but uphold that cognitive 
phenomenology can be explained in terms of sensory phenomenology that typically accompanies 
thinking, such as mental imagery and inner speech.   
 The debate between eliminativism and reductionism about CP may ultimately just be a 
verbal dispute.  The same cannot be said with respect to the debate between reductionism and 
primitivism.  Primitivists agree with reductionists that various forms of sensory phenomenology, 
such as auditory imagery (i.e. inner speech) and visual imagery (i.e. mental pictures), often 
accompany our thoughts.  Unlike reductionists, however, primitivists renounce the claim that this 
concomitant sensory phenomenology exhausts the experiential character of occurrent cognition.  
Consider the thought <buses are yellow>.  Each tokening of this thought may be, and often is, 
connected with a distinct sensory phenomenal character that represents it.  For example, in one 
instance the thought may be represented by a mental image of a yellow bus whereas in another it 
may be represented by an inner speech sentence that says ‘BUSES ARE YELLOW.’  Primitivists 
aver that although these two tokenings of the same thought differ with respect to their sensory 
character, there is nevertheless a common ‘what-it’s-likeness’ that runs through them.  This shared 
experiential character, according to the primitivist, denotes a sui generis cognitive phenomenology, 
one that cannot be reduced to any conjunction of auditory and/or visual imagery. 
 The distinction between weak primitivism and strong primitivism about CP is rarely made in 
the literature on cognitive phenomenology (Levine 2011 is an exception). This distinction is 
motivated by the insight that phenomenal irreducibility does not entail phenomenal independence.  
X phenomenally depends upon Y if and only if X cannot be instantiated in the absence of Y.  Weak 
primitivism holds that while cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to sensory phenomenology, 
cognitive phenomenology cannot be instantiated in the absence of sensory phenomenology.  As 
Levine states, on weak primitivism, “it’s still the case that the only way to phenomenally experience a 
cognitive content is through its effect on some sensory presentation” (Levine 2011: 112). Strong 
primitivism, on the other hand, states that cognitive phenomenology is both phenomenally 
irreducible to, and phenomenally independent of, sensory phenomenology. 
 
II. The ‘Pure Consciousness’ Argument for Strong Primitivism  
 
 
2 See Carruthers and Veillet (2011) for an argument in support of eliminativism. 
  Turner 5 
 
 Some of the most popular arguments for primitivism about CP are phenomenological in 
nature.  These phenomenological arguments often take the form of phenomenal contrast cases 
(Chudnoff 2015).  For example, the phenomenology of an English speaker is contrasted with the 
phenomenology of a person who does not speak English.  We are asked to imagine for the sake of 
argument that both the English speaker and the non-English speaker hear the same English 
sentence uttered by the same person at the same exact location.  There is in this imagining, so the 
argument goes, an overall phenomenal difference between the two speakers despite the fact that 
their respective sensory phenomenologies are identical.  This phenomenological insight is taken to 
suggest that there must be an irreducible cognitive phenomenology associated with understanding 
language. 
 Levine (2011) correctly notes that most of the existing phenomenological arguments for 
primitivism about CP at best support weak primitivism (he calls weak primitivism ‘impure CP’ and 
strong primitivism ‘pure CP’):3  
 
“When it comes to the distinction between pure and impure CP, it seems obvious that this argument [the 
phenomenological contrast argument for primitivism] can’t support more than impure CP.  After all, all the 
examples involve ways of experiencing visual appearances, sound streams, and the like.  The argument is 
addressing someone who doesn’t find anything but sensory phenomenology in her conscious life, and it 
pushes her to notice distinctions among these sensory appearances that can only be accounted for by appeal 
to cognitive penetration.  Fair enough.  Still, this doesn’t get us anything like pure CP.  It’s still possible, for all 
this argument demonstrates, that the only way for a cognitive content to make itself appear to a conscious 
subject is though affecting the way some sensory manifold appears.  That’s impure CP” (Levine 2011: 115-
116). 
 
In this section I offer a phenomenological argument for strong primitivism that is based upon the 
possibility of ‘pure consciousness’.  Pure consciousness is a phenomenal state that is supposed to be 
achievable via meditation.  It is claimed that, during instances of pure consciousness, the intentional 
structure of experience disappears so as to leave nothing but an open phenomenal field.  David 
Woodruff Smith (2011) describes the state of pure consciousness thusly: “In sustained meditation 
the sense of object disappears, i.e. the intentional content or object-specifying sense disappears, and 
the sense of self or subject disappears.  That is to say, the usual intentional structure of subject-
object-or subject-act-content-object-dissolves in such a meditative state.  There is then just this 
flowing phase of consciousness” (Smith 2011: 481).  The ‘pure consciousness’ argument for strong 
primitivism can be represented in the following manner: 
 
3 A notable exception is Chudnoff (2015).  There he presents a phenomenal contrast case that does in fact support 
strong primitivism about CP. 
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The Pure Consciousness Argument for Strong Primitivism: 
 
PP1. Pure consciousness is possible. 
PP2. If pure consciousness is possible, then strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is 
true. 
C1. Therefore, strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is true. 
 
PP1 is supported by the phenomenology of deep meditative experience.  One could push back 
against PP1 by, for example, arguing against the common wisdom that meditation is a reliable 
epistemic guide to the nature of one’s own phenomenal states.  One could also reject PP1 by 
endorsing Franz Brentano’s (1874) thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental.  If Brentano is 
correct in stating that mental states are necessarily intentional, then it follows that pure conscious 
mental states are impossible, for such states are reportedly devoid of intentionality.  Steven Katz 
(1978) argues against the possibility of pure consciousness along these lines.  According to Katz, 
states of pure consciousness are unachievable because all conscious experiences (including mystical 
experiences) are mediated by the presence of some conceptual schema: “The experience itself as well 
as the form in which it is reported is shaped by concepts which the mystic brings to, and which 
shape, his experience” (Katz 1978).  I take the plausibility of PP1 for granted in this paper. To 
reiterate, my main goal here is to establish the veracity of PP2, or the conditional statement which 
says that strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is true if pure consciousness is 
possible.  
 PP2 is prima facie tenable given that states of pure consciousness by definition exist in the 
absence of sensory phenomenology. In other words, if it is possible via meditation to achieve a state 
of consciousness that is devoid of any mental contents (including sensory contents), then it seems to 
follow that cognitive phenomenology is irreducible to, and independent of, sensory phenomenology 
(i.e. strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is true). I see two ways that one could go 
about objecting to PP2.  The first is to deny that pure consciousness involves phenomenal consciousness.  
Perhaps the alleged ‘emptiness’ of states of pure consciousness is due to the fact that such states lack 
phenomenal character.  If pure conscious states are devoid of phenomenal character, then pure 
consciousness is not a kind of cognitive phenomenology, contra to what PP2 suggests.  Proponents 
of pure consciousness are very explicit, however, that there is a what-it’s-likeness associated with being 
in a pure conscious state.  As Smith emphasizes: “This meditative experience is phenomenal: it is 
appearing, “phenomenally”, in consciousness, and what it is like is simply one of being conscious, as 
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if awaiting what else may or may not appear in consciousness” (Smith 2011: 481).  This quote from 
Smith indicates that phenomenality is built into the very concept of pure consciousness.  If this is 
the case, then the present objection (that pure consciousness is non-phenomenal) seems to be at its 
core an objection to PP1, rather than to PP2 as previously supposed.  
 A different way to go about objecting to PP2 is to concede that pure consciousness is phenomenal but 
deny that pure consciousness is cognitive.  According to this objection, the phenomenology of pure 
consciousness involves neither sensory phenomenology nor cognitive phenomenology.  A 
phenomenally conscious mental state X, so the objection goes, qualifies as cognitive if and only if X 
is characterized by a phenomenally conscious cognitive attitude and/or phenomenally conscious 
cognitive contents.  The problem is that states of pure consciousness involve neither cognitive 
attitudes nor cognitive contents because such states are by definition synonymous with the 
disappearance of the intentional structure of experience.  The phenomenology of pure 
consciousness is therefore not a kind of cognitive phenomenology, meaning that the possibility of 
pure consciousness does not entail strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology. Or so the 
objection goes at least. 
 One way to respond to this objection to PP2 is to argue that, despite appearances, states of 
pure consciousness are in fact characterized by some cognitive attitude and/or cognitive contents 
and do therefore denote cognitive phenomenological states. In other words, the proponent of PP2 
might contend that the claim that states of pure consciousness are cognitive in nature can be 
reconciled with the mystics’ claim that states of pure consciousness reveal no discernible intentional 
structure. One way to reconcile these two claims is to aver that pure consciousness is an intentional 
mental state, but that it is an intentional state that has as its object the concept of nothingness, or 
perhaps the concept of non-intentionality itself.  Put differently, the idea is that pure consciousness 
might be an intentional state that represents the state of non-representation.  Construing pure 
consciousness in this light allows the proponent of PP2 to maintain that pure consciousness is a type 
of cognitive phenomenology (because it involves cognitive contents) while acknowledging that states 
of pure consciousness seem to be devoid of intentionality from a first-person, phenomenological 
point of view.  
This proposed analysis of pure consciousness is similar in many respects to how various 
philosophers of mind analyze the phenomenology of moods.  Moods, such as elation and anxiety, are 
also sometimes thought to be non-intentional, undirected mental states.  However, advocates of 
Brentano’s thesis (see above) reject this conception of moods as non-intentional and instead claim 
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that "while moods appear not to be directed at anything, upon closer examination, it turns out that 
they are in fact directed at special kinds of objects: bodily states or unusual external objects, such as 
the world as a whole, indeterminate intentional objects, or frequently changing objects (see Goldie 
2000, 2002, Seager 2002, Seager and Bourget 2007, and Tye 2008)” (Mendelovici 2013: 8-9).  Just as 
some philosophers try to explain away the apparent non-intentionality of moods, I am suggesting 
here that the proponent of PP2 might try to explain away the apparent non-intentionality of pure 
conscious states. More specifically, in the same way that the intentional object of states of anxiety or 
elation might be ‘the world as a whole’ or ‘everything’, the proponent of PP2 might suggest that the 
object of states of pure consciousness is ‘the absence of an intentional world’, or ‘nothing’.  If this is 
right, then it is unsurprising that states of pure consciousness are (mistakenly) reported to be devoid 
of intentionality. 
 The objector to PP2 may at this juncture in the dialectic accuse me of changing the subject, 
or at the very least, of misunderstanding the concept of pure consciousness.  The mystics’ claim, the 
objector may insist, is not merely that pure consciousness appears to lack intentionality; it is rather the 
more robust claim that pure consciousness as a matter of fact lacks intentionality.  In response to this, 
the proponent of PP2 might just double down and declare that pure consciousness is ‘cognitive' 
precisely because pure conscious states are, despite phenomenological appearances, actually 
intentional.   
 Perhaps pure consciousness is by definition non-intentional though and the above idea that 
states of pure consciousness intentionally represent the state of non-representation is mistaken.  I 
grant that states of pure consciousness cannot properly be called ‘cognitive’ phenomenal states if 
this is the case. For again, phenomenal states plausibly only qualify as ‘cognitive’ if they are 
characterized by some sort of intentional cognitive attitude and/or cognitive contents. The fact of 
the matter, however, is that a phenomenological argument for strong primitivism can be given 
without appealing to the notion of pure consciousness.  Even if pure consciousness is not a kind of cognitive 
phenomenology, it is not difficult to imagine a slightly modified phenomenological argument for strong primitivism that 
is based upon the phenomenology of meditation.  One might argue, for example, that isolated awareness of 
propositional contents during ‘mindfulness’ meditation (or during immersion in a sensory 
deprivation tank) constitutes phenomenological evidence in support of strong primitivism.  
According to Smith, "observant self-awareness is the goal of the practice called ‘mindfulness’ or 
vipassana in one Buddhist tradition.  In this practice the meditative experience prepares for an 
experience of consciousness per se-pure awareness, as it were-and allows then for noticing particular 
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thoughts, feelings, or sensations that may come along in the stream of consciousness” (Smith 2011: 
481).  Isolated awareness of propositional contents is not pure consciousness, but it is arguably a 
phenomenal experience that lends credence to strong primitivism. For to say that one’s phenomenal 
field is exhausted by awareness of propositional contents is to say that one is experiencing a state of 
consciousness that involves cognitive phenomenology in the absence of any accompanying sensory 
phenomenology. 
 
III. The ‘Higher-Order Thought’ Argument for Strong Primitivism 
 
 I turn now to the second argument for strong primitivism, which is motivated by the higher-
order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness.  The higher-order thought theory of consciousness, 
the chief proponent of which is David Rosenthal (1986, 1993, 2005), affirms that a mental state X 
becomes conscious when X is taken as the object of a higher-order thought.  Rosenthal takes the 
relationship between the HOT and the first-order mental state to be one of representation (as 
opposed to say, acquaintance).  The argument from HOT theory to strong primitivism has the 
following basic structure: 
 
The Higher-Order Thought Argument for Strong Primitivism: 
 
QP1. HOT theory is true. 
QP2. HOT theory entails strong primitivism about CP. 
C1. Therefore, strong primitivism about CP is true. 
 
Two important interrelated clarificatory remarks are in order with respect to the scope of this 
argument. First, the argument only concerns versions of HOT theory that aim to explain phenomenal 
consciousness, or the ‘what-it’s-likeness’ of experience. This stipulation is necessary in order to draw a 
connection between the veracity of HOT theory and the veracity of strong primitivism. HOT theory 
is, however, first and foremost a theory of state consciousness, not phenomenal consciousness.  The 
term ‘state consciousness’, as I am using it here, denotes the idea that a conscious mental state is a 
state that one is aware of being in.  Thus, a mental state X of subject S possesses state consciousness 
if and only if S is aware of X.  State consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are not 
necessarily one and the same thing, meaning that HOT theories are not necessarily theories of 
phenomenal consciousness.   
 There is in fact considerable controversy over what the relationship is between state 
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness (if any).  Some philosophers, such as Lycan (1996), 
  Turner 10 
 
suggest that state consciousness is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness.  Others, 
such as Block (2011), believe that phenomenal consciousness outstrips state consciousness in the 
sense that one can be phenomenally conscious of X despite not being aware of X.  Block calls this 
idea ‘phenomenological overflow’.  I remain neutral regarding the relationship between state 
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.  The only point that matters for the purposes of this 
discussion is that the HOT argument for strong primitivism applies only to versions of HOT theory 
that purport to explain both state consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.   
Now, one might worry that HOT theories are only fit (and only deployed for that matter) to 
explain state consciousness (not phenomenal consciousness), and that consequently the HOT 
argument for strong primitivism is a nonstarter.  This worry is negated by the fact that Rosenthal’s 
HOT theory, which is the most prominent version of the view, is in fact designed to explain both 
phenomenal consciousness as well as state consciousness.  Rosenthal himself says: “As many, myself 
included, use that phrase, there being something it’s like for one to be in a state is simply its seeming 
subjectively that one is in that state.  Indeed, Block (2011: 424) quotes me to that effect: ‘What it is 
like for one to have a pain, in the relevant sense of that idiom, is simply what it is like for one to be 
conscious of having that pain’” (Rosenthal 1997: 433).  
The second clarificatory remark regarding the scope of the argument is that the argument 
only concerns actualist versions of HOT theory.  According to actualist HOT theories, the 
consciousness conferring higher-order thoughts are occurrent mental states, which is to say, mental 
states that are being actively entertained by a subject. Rosenthal’s HOT theory is a version of 
actualist HOT theory. Actualist HOT theory is contrasted with dispositional HOT theory, the leading 
proponent of which is Peter Carruthers (2005).  Dispositional HOT theory asserts that the relevant 
higher-order thoughts are dispositional mental states as opposed to occurrent ones.  Gennaro 
explains that “the basic idea [behind dispositional HOT theory] is that the conscious status of an 
experience is due to its availability to higher-order thought…Thus, no actual HOT occurs” (Gennaro 
2018).  Dispositional HOT theory is by definition not included within the purview of the HOT 
argument for strong primitivism. This is because dispositional HOT theories are unable to account 
for phenomenal consciousness.  As mentioned in section I, phenomenally conscious states are by 
nature occurrent mental states, not dispositional ones. For it is impossible to be phenomenally 
conscious of a mental state that one is not currently instantiating. Rosenthal agrees with this 
sentiment, as he says that “being disposed to have a thought about something doesn’t make one 
conscious of that thing, but only potentially conscious of it” (Rosenthal 2004: 28). Because 
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dispositional HOT theories cannot account for phenomenal consciousness, they are not included 
within the purview of the HOT argument for strong primitivism. 
I assume for the sake of argument in this paper that Rosenthal’s HOT theory is plausible. 
While there are various objections to the HOT theory of consciousness (e.g. see Sebastián 2019), the 
plausibility of the view is established by the fact that the view is an influential and popular theory of 
consciousness in the literature.  As mentioned, the aim of this section is not to defend Rosenthal’s 
HOT theory (i.e. QP1) but rather to establish the conditional statement which says that strong 
primitivism follows from the truth of HOT theory (i.e. QP2). Hence the question: does Rosenthal’s 
HOT theory entail strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology?  
 One might doubt QP2 on the grounds that first-order sensory states are necessary for 
phenomenal consciousness on HOT theory. If HOT theory holds that phenomenal consciousness 
requires the presence of first-order sensory states, then it is presumably false that HOT theory 
entails strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology. In fact, HOT theory is arguably 
incompatible with strong primitivism if it asserts that first-order sensory states are necessary for 
consciousness. For it plausibly cannot simultaneously be the case that both (a) cognitive 
phenomenology is irreducible to, and independent of, sensory phenomenology, and (b) phenomenal 
consciousness necessitates the presence of first-order sensory states. In other words, if a mental state 
requires sensory input in order to be phenomenally conscious, then it is impossible for a 
phenomenally conscious mental state to exist in the absence of sensory phenomenology. 
Fortunately for the proponent of the HOT argument for strong primitivism, HOT theory is 
not actually committed to (b). This is because the theory upholds that the higher-order thoughts are 
themselves sufficient for consciousness. Rosenthal says exactly this: “And on that construal of ‘what 
it’s like,’ the theory does hold that a HOT is sufficient for there to be something it’s like for one to 
be in the state the HOT describes, even if that state doesn’t occur” (Rosenthal, 1997: 433-434). Call 
this “the sufficiency condition”: 
 
The Sufficiency Condition: Lone higher-order thoughts are sufficient for phenomenal 
consciousness. 
 
 Rosenthal adopts the sufficiency condition in order to account for cases of misrepresentation. 
Where there is representation, there is also the possibility of misrepresentation. This modal truth 
gives rise to the following question, which the HOT theorist must answer. Namely, what happens 
when a higher-order thought misrepresents the content of an occurrent first-order perceptual state? 
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Is the resulting conscious state characterized by the veridical content of the first-order state, or by 
the misrepresented content of the higher-order state? The former option, according to Rosenthal, is 
inadequate because it seems to render the higher-order state completely irrelevant with respect to the 
production of phenomenal consciousness. To ensure that higher-order thoughts play an essential 
role in generating consciousness, Rosenthal denies that first-order sensory states are required for 
phenomenality. Thus, according to Rosenthal, consciousness is instantiated during cases of 
targetlessness, or cases in which a higher-order thought represents there to be a first-order state that 
does not actually exist. Sam Coleman summarizes Rosenthal’s position thusly:  
 
How does it feel to be aware of oneself as instantiating a red London bus- is percept when no such percept 
obtains? Conscious mental life is the stuff of appearances, Rosenthal emphasizes: thus, since the appearance 
to the subject is the same whether or not she tokens a red London bus-sh percept (providing the same HOT 
is in place), her experience is indistinguishable across both cases-as hallucinations can be indistinguishable 
from their veridical counterparts. Corresponding remarks apply to misrepresentation: HOTs govern the 
subjective mental appearances constitutive of the subject’s stream of consciousness (Coleman, 2015: 2705). 
 
It is the sufficiency condition that explains why HOT theory implies strong primitivism. For to say 
that HOTs can instantiate phenomenal consciousness in the absence of first-order sensory states is 
precisely to say the cognitive phenomenology does not depend upon sensory phenomenology. I am 
admittedly not the first person to make this argument. Richard Brown and Pete Mandik (2012) 
explicitly make the connection between HOT’s sufficiency condition and cognitive phenomenology: 
 
This sufficiency claim about HOTs is a key commonality between HOT theory and one of the central theses 
defended by cognition phenomenology proponents: A thought can give rise to there being something it’s like, 
and does not do so in virtue of there being some co- occuring non-cognitive state (Brown & Mandik, 2012: 
4). 
 
It is worth highlighting that Brown & Mandik do not distinguish between different views of 
cognitive phenomenology in their paper. It can be discerned that Brown & Mandik are concerned 
with primitivism about cognitive phenomenology, but they do not differentiate between weak 
primitivism and strong primitivism. I differentiate between these two versions and am making the 
specific contention that HOT theory supports strong primitivism.  
The opponent of the HOT argument for strong primitivism might, at this stage in the 
dialectic, concede that the sufficiency condition is built into Rosenthal’s HOT theory, but maintain 
that there are other actualist versions of HOT theory that do not endorse the sufficiency condition.4 
 
4 Carruthers (2008) makes this exact point when discussing the sufficiency condition. 
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Sam Coleman (2015), for example, defends a version of actualist HOT theory that he claims is not 
committed to the sufficiency condition. Coleman calls his view the quotational higher-order thought 
(QHOT) theory of consciousness. According to QHOT theory, the relationship between the higher-
order thought and the first-order state is not one of mental representation (as Rosenthal would have 
it), but rather one of “mental quotation.” Coleman contends that mental quotation, unlike mental 
representation, allows for “genuine intimacy with our sensory states, in sensory consciousness” 
(Coleman, 2015: 2711).5 The upshot of this contention for Coleman is that first-order sensory states 
are necessary for phenomenal consciousness on QHOT theory. Coleman explicitly rejects the 
notion that isolated QHOTs are sufficient for consciousness:  
 
What of targetlessness? A lone QHOT won’t suffice for a conscious state. Here’s why. QHOTs are 
hypothesized to supply subjective awareness. However, if a QHOT has no sensory target to embed, it could 
at most arouse subjective awareness of (a state of) nothing, since it altogether lacks first-order content. But 
subjective awareness of a state of nothing at all just isn’t subjective awareness, since subjective awareness 
must be (intentionally) of something. An experience literally of nothing is simply no experience. Therefore an 
empty QHOT won’t produce subjective awareness—or a conscious state. QHOTs can only make the subject 
aware of something if there is something (sensory content) to be aware of (Coleman 2015: 2722). 
 
If QHOT theory does in fact hold that first-order sensory states are necessary for consciousness, 
then it is false that actualist HOT theory implies strong primitivism. The proponent of the HOT 
argument for strong primitivism might respond here by maintaining (contra Coleman) that QHOT 
theory is committed to the sufficiency condition. The response that I have in mind involves appealing 
to the possibility of pure consciousness. The concept of pure consciousness, as discussed, suggests that 
phenomenal experience can exist in the absence of any intentional structure. If pure consciousness is 
possible, then Coleman is wrong in stating that “an experience literally of nothing is simply no 
experience” (Coleman, 2015: 2722). More to the point: there is reason to believe that targetless 
QHOTs do suffice for phenomenal experience given the possibility of pure consciousness. And if 
this is the case, then QHOT theory is committed to the sufficiency condition.  
Assume for the sake of argument, however, that Coleman is correct in believing that QHOT 
theory rejects the sufficiency condition. The proponent of QP2 might grant this assumption but 
nevertheless insist that QHOT theory entails strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology. 
Specifically, the proponent of QP2 might concur with Coleman that phenomenal experiences are 
 
5 The concept of ‘mental quotation’ is not synonymous with the concept of ‘mental acquaintance’, where acquaintance is 
understood in the Russellian sense. Relatedly, Coleman’s QHOT theory is not synonymous with the higher-order 
acquaintance theory of consciousness defended by Hellie (2007). 
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necessarily of something but reject Coleman’s assumption that this “something” has to be a sensory 
state. One might ask: what happens when a QHOT takes as its object a first-order thought (as opposed 
to a first-order sensory state)? Coleman presumably avers that consciousness is not instantiated in 
these cases, for he, to repeat, believes that phenomenal experience requires the presence of first-
order sensory states on QHOT theory. An interlocutor might press Coleman though by questioning 
why the first-order mental states have to be sensory in nature. If QHOTs function to bestow 
consciousness upon first-order sensory states, then why would they not also function to bestow 
consciousness upon first-order cognitive states? Consistency arguably demands that first-order 
cognitive states also be made phenomenally conscious on the theory when embedded within a 
QHOT. Brown & Mandik raise this point in the context of discussing HOT theory in general.6 
If first-order thoughts are rendered phenomenally conscious when embedded in QHOTs, 
then QHOT theory implies strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology. This conditional 
holds true even if it is granted that QHOT theory rejects the sufficiency condition and says that 
first-order mental states are necessary for the bestowal of phenomenal consciousness. I am neutral 
about whether QHOT theory entails strong primitivism. Perhaps the HOT argument for strong 
primitivism is only tenable with respect to Rosenthal’s HOT theory and should therefore be 
narrowed in its scope. Nevertheless, the HOT argument is clearly still interesting as Rosenthal’s 
HOT theory is fairly prominent in the consciousness literature.  
 
IV. Premise 2: From Strong Primitivism to the Non-Necessity of Sensory 
Processing 
 
Thus far I have introduced the cognitive phenomenology debate in the philosophy of mind and 
presented two arguments for the veracity of strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology: 
what I called the argument from pure consciousness and the argument from HOT theory. There is 
surely much more to be said about each of these arguments and about the prospects of strong 
primitivism in general.  The purpose of this paper is to simply motivate strong primitivism as a 
plausible view and then demonstrate that the truth of strong primitivism arguably entails the 
possibility of disembodied AI consciousness.  
 
6 Brown & Mandik (2012) also make the point that consistency demands that first-order cognitive states be made 
phenomenally conscious when discussing HOT theory in general. 
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Assume for the sake of argument, then, that strong primitivism about cognitive 
phenomenology is true.  Why think that this phenomenological truth has metaphysical implications? 
In other words, why think that P2 of the cognitive phenomenology argument for disembodied AI 
consciousness is true? Why think that it follows from the fact that cognitive phenomenology does 
not depend upon sensory phenomenology to the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness does 
not depend upon sensory processing in the brain? The short answer is that P2 is the result of an 
inference to the best explanation. Namely, the best explanation for why cognitive phenomenology does 
not depend upon sensory phenomenology is that sensory processing is not a necessary condition for 
phenomenal consciousness. 
The defender of P2 can also point out that it is commonplace in the philosophy of mind to 
draw metaphysical conclusions about the nature of consciousness based upon phenomenological 
premises. Two examples of such arguments are the ‘Transparency Argument for First-Order 
Representationalism’ (Tye, 2002) and the ‘Peripheral Inner Awareness Argument for Self-
Representationalism’ (Kriegel, 2009). Both of these arguments assume that the phenomenology of 
conscious experience can inform us about the underlying metaphysical nature of experience. With 
respect to the ‘Transparency’ argument, for instance, the idea is that first-order representationalism 
(a metaphysical thesis) can be derived from the fact that the only introspectively discernible aspect 
of experience is its world-directed representational content (a phenomenological thesis). P2 of the 
cognitive phenomenology argument for disembodied AI consciousness employs similar reasoning. 
Specifically, the premise relies on the following principle (call it ‘PHEN’) 
 
PHEN: Phenomenological independence implies metaphysical independence. 
 
According to PHEN, it follows from the fact that X is phenomenologically independent of Y to the 
conclusion that X can be instantiated in the absence of the metaphysical underpinning of Y. Applied 
to cognitive phenomenology, the idea is that if cognitive phenomenology is independent of sensory 
phenomenology, then cognitive phenomenology can be instantiated in the absence of sensory 
processing, meaning that sensory processing is not a precondition for phenomenal consciousness.  
One might object to PHEN on the grounds that there are obvious counterexamples to the 
principle. For example, <pain> is phenomenologically independent of <C-fibers firing> given that 
the latter is not phenomenological at all. It does not follow from this fact, however, that <pain> is 
metaphysically independent of <C-fibers firing> or that the sensation of pain is not equivalent to 
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the firing of C-fibers.7 <Pain> may be metaphysically dependent upon <C-fibers firing> (i.e., the 
thesis of multiple realizability may be false), despite the fact that the former is phenomenologically 
independent of the latter. 
 This objection to PHEN rests on a (understandable) misunderstanding of what is meant by 
‘phenomenological dependence/independence’.  The relationship of phenomenological 
dependence/independence is by stipulation a relationship that holds between two phenomenal 
properties, signifying that the relata must both be experientially manifest.  Since the firing of C-fibers 
is not experientially manifest, it makes no sense to say that <pain> is phenomenologically 
independent of <C-fibers firing>.  It does make sense, however, to say that agential experience is 
phenomenologically independent of moral experience, or that conative experience is 
phenomenologically independent of cognitive experience, or that cognitive experience is 
phenomenologically independent of sensory experience.  For all of the relata in these cases are 
experientially manifest properties. 
 Of course, PHEN remains controversial even with this clarification in place.  It may be the 
case, for example, that while sensory processing (e.g. the presence of what Koch calls ‘the sensory 
hot zone’ (Koch, Massimini, Boly & Tononi 2016)) is a developmental precondition for 
consciousness, it is nevertheless true that as we get older we develop a kind of sui generis cognitive 
phenomenology that can be instantiated in the absence of sensory phenomenology.  There is, on the 
face of it, nothing conceptually problematic about this objection to P2.  The burden of proof is 
squarely on the objector though to explain how it is possible that (a) phenomenal consciousness 
metaphysically depends upon sensory processing, but (b) cognitive experience does not 
phenomenologically depend upon sensory experience.  I am not aware of any explanation to this 
effect that currently exists in the literature.  P2 is highly plausible until such an explanation is given. 
 Before moving on to P3 of the cognitive phenomenology argument, it is worth drawing 
attention to the fact that weak primitivism about cognitive phenomenology clearly does not indicate 
that sensory processing is not necessary for consciousness.  This is precisely because weak 
primitivism states that cognitive phenomenology cannot be instantiated in the absence of sensory 
phenomenology (despite being irreducible to sensory phenomenology).  
 
V. Premise 3: From the Non-Necessity of Sensory Processing to Disembodied 
AI Consciousness 
 
7 I thank Bill Lycan for bringing this objection to my attention. 
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 Assume now that both P1 and P2 are true, and that consequently, phenomenal 
consciousness does not require sensory processing.  How does this conclusion bear on the 
philosophy of artificial intelligence?  In particular, what is the reasoning behind P3?  It is vital to 
accentuate that P3 operates under the controversial assumption that AI consciousness is in principle possible.  I do 
not make any arguments for or against the possibility of AI consciousness here.  Rather, I simply 
assume that AI consciousness is possible and proceed to address the following question (call it ‘the 
embodiment question’ (EQ)): 
 
EQ: Would AI consciousness, should it exist, require embodiment? 
 
EQ is a pressing question in the philosophy of artificial intelligence.  We want to know whether or 
not disembodied AI systems (such as neurotrophic supercomputers or sophisticated personal 
assistants- perhaps future versions of Apple’s ‘Siri’ or Google’s ‘Alexa’) are capable of what-it’s-
likeness.8  It is likely, after all, that such systems will be able to pass the Turing test in the not too 
distant future.  According to a survey conducted by Bostrom and Muller (2016), “experts estimate 
the probability of achieving ‘high level machine intelligence’ to go over 50% by 2040-2050, over 
90% by 2075” (Muller 2016: 4).   
 One relevant worry here is that we will inevitably attribute consciousness to future 
disembodied AIs.  Perhaps it is psychologically infeasible to deny phenomenal experience to an AI 
system that is verbally and behaviorally indistinguishable from a normal adult interlocutor.  If this is 
the case, and disembodied AIs are incapable of experience, then there is a very real concern that 
humanity will be psychologically duped into thinking that unfeeling computer programs are 
phenomenally conscious.  I call this the duped-dystopia scenario.  An answer to EQ must be provided in 
order to ensure that the duped-dystopia scenario is avoided.  P3 states that AI consciousness does 
not require embodiment assuming that phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory 
processing.  The basic proposition motivating P3 is that embodiment is necessary for consciousness only if 
sensory processing is necessary for consciousness.  To resist this proposition, the objector to P3 must 
somehow demonstrate that consciousness requires embodiment even if consciousness does not 
necessitate sensory processing.  It is prima facie difficult to discern how this feat could be 
accomplished.   
 
8 It is not clear whether deep learning systems count as ‘sensory’ in the same way that a brain counts as sensory. 
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 The first point to note here is that ‘embodiment’ is often understood (at least partly) in terms 
of the ability to exercise sensorimotor capacities.  Take the embodied cognition approach in cognitive 
science, for example.  As indicated by its name, the embodied cognition approach maintains that the 
instantiation of cognitive processes requires embodiment.  The approach thereby rejects the 
traditional computational view of the mind, according to which cognition is essentially a matter of 
internal information processing.  Crucially, proponents of the embodied cognition approach 
typically reference sensorimotor capacities when defining the concept of embodiment.   Monica 
Cowart, for example, asserts that within the context of the embodied cognition debate, “the basic 
notion of embodiment is broadly understood as the unique way an organism’s sensorimotor 
capacities enable it to successfully interact with its environmental niche” (Cowart 2004).  In a similar 
vein, Chris Letheby defines the embodied cognition approach as the thesis which “holds that 
conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems” 
(Letheby 2012: 403).  If embodiment by definition requires the possession of sensorimotor 
capacities (and hence sensory processing), then P3 is necessarily true.  For it is impossible that 
embodiment is a precondition for consciousness if embodiment requires sensory processing, and it 
is stipulated that sensory processing is not a precondition for consciousness. 
 I will assume for the sake of argument that embodiment does not by definition require the 
possession of sensorimotor capacities.  Even granting this assumption, the burden of proof is still 
on the objector to P3 to explain how embodiment could be necessary for phenomenal 
consciousness given that consciousness does not depend upon sensory processing.  There are 
different ways the objector might go about providing such an explanation.  From my perspective, 
the only feasible way to object to P3 is to make the following threefold contention: 
 
Contention 1: Being alive is a necessary condition for being phenomenally conscious. 
Contention 2: Embodiment is a necessary condition for being alive. 
Contention 3: Being phenomenally conscious does not require the possession of sensorimotor 
capacities. 
 
Successfully making this threefold contention is synonymous with illustrating that consciousness 
requires embodiment but not sensory processing and is thus synonymous with illustrating the falsity 
of P3.  There is, of course, the question as to whether these three contentions are mutually consistent.  
The position in the philosophy of consciousness known as autopoiesis enactivism (Degenaar & O’Regan 
2017, Kirchhoff 2018) is committed to both Contention 1 and Contention 2.  It is unclear, however, 
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whether autopoiesis enactivism is compatible with Contention 3.  I do not consider any arguments 
for or against autopoietic enactivism here.  Rather, I assume that autopoietic enactivism is plausible 
and advance to ask whether the view can be weaponized as an objection to P3.  Making sense of this 
question requires an understanding of enactivism, and in particular, an understanding of the 
distinction between autopoiesis enactivism and sensorimotor enactivism. 
 Enactive theories of consciousness understand consciousness to be interactive in nature as 
opposed to passive, meaning that phenomenal experience according to the enactivist is something 
that we do as opposed to something that transpires within us.  As Jan Degennar and J. Kevin O’ 
Regan observe, “Enactive approaches to consciousness emphasize patterns of interaction, and active 
engagement, instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment” (Degenaar & Regan 
2017: 393).  Enactivism represents an embodied theory of consciousness due to its emphasis on 
bodily interactions with the external world.9  The pressing question for any enactive theory is: exactly 
which interactive capacities are necessary and sufficient for consciousness?  This inquiry raises the 
crucial distinction between autopoietic enactivism and sensorimotor enactivism.  The latter version of the 
view maintains that the relevant interactive capacities are sensorimotor capacities.  More to the 
point, sensorimotor enactivism says that the possession of sensorimotor capacities is both necessary 
and sufficient for consciousness (O’Regan and Noe¨ 2001; O’Regan 2011; Degenaar and O’Regan 
2015).  By contrast, autopoietic enactivism de-emphasizes the role of sensorimotor capacities, 
focusing instead on a perceived inextricable link between consciousness and interactive capacities 
associated with being alive.  ‘Life’ in the context of this theory is defined in terms of ‘autopoiesis’.  
As Degenaar and Regan clarify, “In the enactive literature, life is typically understood as autopoiesis 
(Maturana & Varela 1980). Living organisms are spontaneously active, self-maintaining and self-
producing systems, and it has been proposed that we should understand our phenomenology in light 
of this self-creating or ‘autopoietic’ organization” (Degenaar & Regan 2015: 396).  Degenaar and 
Regan further elucidate that ‘autopoiesis’ necessarily involves embodied interaction with the 
environment: “An autopoietic system needs to metabolize and continuously adapt to its 
environment in order to continue its activity. By its very definition autopoiesis cannot withdraw 
itself from the interactive context” (Degenaar & Regan 2015: 397-398).   
 
9 The concept of ‘enaction’ derives from the book The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991), in which the 
authors attempt to revolutionize cognitive science by connecting cognitive science with Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) 
phenomenological wok on embodiment. 
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 Autopoietic enactivism, then, says that life is necessary for consciousness, where life is taken 
to be a fundamentally interactive process that mandates embodiment.  It is for this reason that 
autopoietic enactivism is committed to Contention 1 and Contention 2 above.  The essential 
question for the objector to P3, as indicated, is whether autopoetic enactivism is compatible with 
Contention 3, according to which the possession of sensorimotor capacities is not necessary for 
consciousness.  There is reason to doubt that the two are compatible. Autopoietic enactivism is, 
after all, motivated by the conviction that “perceptual consciousness involves additional constraints 
over and above perceptual capacity” (Degenaar & Regan 2015: 397-398).  In other words, while 
autopoeitic enactivists deny that the possession of sensorimotor capacities is a sufficient condition for 
consciousness, they tend to agree with sensorimotor enactivists that possessing said capacities is a 
necessary condition for consciousness.  Is it possible for the autopoietic enactivist to uphold Contention 
3, even though the majority of autopoietic enactivists explicitly accept the proposition that 
consciousness requires sensorimotor skills?  I would argue that this answer to this question is no.  It 
seems to me that autopoietic enactivism and Contention 3 are mutually inconsistent because 
autopoietic processes arguably depend upon sensorimotor skills. 
 To summarize: P3 states that AI consciousness (assuming that it is possible) does not require 
embodiment if phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing.  To object to P3, 
one must explain how embodiment could be necessary for phenomenal consciousness given that 
consciousness does not depend upon sensory processing.  I first pointed out that it is impossible for 
the objector to achieve this feat if embodiment is defined (at least partly) in terms of the ability to 
exercise sensorimotor skills.  Then, I considered and eventually rejected the idea that auopoietic 
enactivism can be levied as an objection to P3. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 P1 of the cognitive phenomenology argument for disembodied AI consciousness holds that 
strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology is true.  I have not attempted to establish the 
veracity of strong primitivism here.  Instead, I have merely contended that strong primitivism is 
credible given certain theoretical assumptions; in particular, the assumption that pure consciousness 
is possible and/or the assumption that Rosenthal’s HOT theory is true.  P2 of the argument goes on 
to state that sensory processing is not a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness if strong 
primitivism is true.  I argued that P2 is strongly supported by what I call PHEN but acknowledged 
that PHEN can be reasonably resisted.  Finally, I illustrated that while it is possible to object to P3, it 
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is fair to say that P3 is the least controversial premise of the argument.  The conclusion that AI 
consciousness does not necessitate embodiment is by no means trivial.  Such a conclusion widens 
the scope of possible types of conscious AIs, and arguably even suggests that there are two 
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